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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CUBS LOSE ON
JUSTICE WARD'S ERROR
R H E
Illinois Supreme Court 1 0 1
Chicago Cubs 0 0 0
Baseball purists have always believed that Abner Doubleday' never
intended for the game to be played at night. If this is true, then Abner
must be smiling in his grave after the Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Chicago National League Ballclub v. Thompson 2 ("Thompson") not to
allow the installation of lights in Wrigley Field. The court based its deci-
sion on state and city legislation regulating nighttime noise pollution.
FACTS
This case was unique in that it involved two of Chicago's more fa-
mous (or infamous) traditions, baseball and politics. The Chicago Na-
tional League Ballclub, Inc. ("Cubs") has exclusively played its major
league home games in venerable Wrigley Field since 1926. Wrigley
Field, built in 1914, with its grass field, ivy-covered, brick outfield walls,
small 37,000 seating capacity, manually operated scoreboards, and no
lights is the oldest ballpark in the National League. It is the only major
league park without lights.3 Along with Ernie Banks4 and a history of
losing teams, the field is a symbol for the Cubs and a source of pride for
the city of Chicago.5
Due to a change in ownership in 198 1,6 and amid changing eco-
nomic conditions in baseball,7 the Cubs began to think seriously about
1. Founded the game of baseball in approximately 1846. THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA, THE COMPLETE & OFFICIAL RECORD OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 9 (1st ed. 1974)
(hereinafter THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA).
2. 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985).
3. CHICAGO CUBS MEDIA GUIDE 4 (1983).
4. Known as "Mr. Cub." A Hall of Fame infielder who played for Chicago from 1953-
1971. THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1 at 268.
5. As Cook County Circuit Court Judge Richard Curry said in his trial court opinion,
"For some generations Wrigley Field itself was the primary attraction and watching the Cubs
play ball was merely an added curiosity." Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson,
No. 84CH 11384, slip op. at 5 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County Mar. 25, 1985).
6. Chewing gum magnate William Wrigley sold the team to the Tribune Co. Id. at 6.
7. It has become extremely difficult for baseball franchises to turn a profit. In 1984, the
Cubs won the National League East pennant for the first time since 1945. Despite their best
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equipping Wrigley Field with lights to allow for night games.' The prob-
lem with the idea was that Wrigley Field is located on the north side of
Chicago, in the residential area of Lake View. Most of the buildings on
the surrounding streets are multi-unit dwellings, which gives Lake View
a highly concentrated population.9 Night games, according to some,
would disrupt the area and create a nuisance.1"
In 1982, the Illinois state legislature passed an amendment to Title
VI, section 25 of the state Environmental Protection Act, preventing
nighttime noise pollution. It read in part:
Baseball, football, or soccer sporting events played during
nighttime hours, by professional athletes, in a city with more
than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium at which such night-
time events were not played prior to July 1, 1982, shall be sub-
ject to nighttime noise emission regulations promulgated by the
Illinois Pollution Control Board."
In 1983, the city of Chicago passed a similar ordinance. It read in
part:
It shall be unlawful.., to produce any sporting event...
if any part of such athletic contest, sport, game or any other
amusement as defined in Chapter 104 takes place between the
hours of 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., and is presented in a stadium
or playing field which is not totally enclosed and contains more
than 15,000 seats where any such seats are located within 500
feet of 100 or more dwelling units.'2
Both pieces of legislation in effect prevented the Cubs from install-
ing lights in Wrigley Field.
In December 1984, the Cubs filed their complaint in the Circuit
Court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment that the regula-
tions violated the constitutional provision of separation of powers, the
federal and state guarantees of due process and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Arti-
performance and highest attendance in decades, the Cubs still lost money. See, Say It Ain't So:
The Cubs Could Leave Wrigley Field, Bus. WK., June 17, 1985, at 61.
8. This was not the first suit involving the installation of lights in Wrigley Field. In 1968,
minority shareholder William Shlensky unsuccessfully filed a stockholder's derivative suit
against majority owner Phillip K. Wrigley. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237
N.E.2d 776 (1968).
9. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1248.
10. The threat of nighttime baseball was the reason the Lake View Citizen's Council inter-
vened as a defendant in this case. Id. at 362, 483 N.E.2d at 1247.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/2, para. 25 (1983).
12. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 104.1-14.1 (1983).
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cle 1, Section II of the Illinois Constitution, and the Special Legislation
Clause of the Illinois Constitution.'" The Cubs sought to enjoin Illinois
Governor James R. Thompson from enforcing the state regulation and
the city of Chicago from enforcing the city ordinance.' 4 The Lake View
Citizens Council, composed of individuals residing or working in the
area surrounding Wrigley Field, intervened as a defendant.' 5
In March 1985, the circuit court ruled against the Cubs on all
claims.' 6 On direct appeal, in October 1985, the Illinois Supreme Court
delivered a straightforward opinion, unanimously affirming the circuit
court's decision.'
7
THE COURT'S REASONING
Justice Ward, writing for the Illinois Supreme Court, first addressed
the issue of separation of powers. The Cubs had argued that the state
statute and the city ordinance deprived them of due process by "declar-
ing as law the conclusive presumption that night baseball at Wrigley Field
constitutes a private nuisance.""
13. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 361-62, 483 N.E.2d at 1247.
14. Id. at 362, 483 N.E.2d at 1247.
15. Id.
16. Chicago Nat'l League Ballclub, Inc. v. Thompson, No. 84CH 11384, slip. op. at 64,
(Cir. Ct. of Cook County Mar. 25, 1985). Circuit Court Judge Richard Curry, writing a 64-
page decision, first noted the problems that a major influx of fans would cause to the neighbor-
hood at night. The judge thought the legislature and the city could properly regulate and saw
the regulations as a modest exercise of police power, considering the "cumulative impact of
crowd noise, traffic congestion, stadium-related litter, parking inadequacies, and crowd-related
indignities." Judge Curry thought these problems would be magnified at night. Id. at 13.
The judge viewed it as significant that the regulations did not diminish the Cubs' present
use of Wrigley Field. The judge also rejected the Cubs' claims that they were singled out for
punishment and that the regulations violated equal protection. In summing up what was an
emotion-charged and colorful opinion, Judge Curry wrote:
Yes, you're out. O... U...T... The Cubs are out. The inning is over. The contest is
lost. Now it's time for the box score, summary and wrap-up. Have you ever heard a
post-mortem on a sporting event when some "intangible" wasn't cited as an element
in the victory or the defeat? Well we have one in this case also. The Cubs lost, of
course, for all the reasons stated above but, in addition thereto, they should have had
a better scouting report before coming to court. Everyone around the courthouse is
familiar with 'Justice'-with her robes flowing, her blindfold and her scales. What
the Cubs 'book' on her failed to note is that she is a southpaw. Justice is a southpaw
and the Cubs just don't hit lefties!!! Id. at 63.
17. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 372, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
18. Id. at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1248 (emphasis added). In other words, the Cubs felt it was
premature of the legislature and the city to declare night baseball a public nuisance, before
lights had been given a chance. According to the Cubs, a determination should only be made
by means of a civil suit when a citizen brought a claim for private nuisance after the lights had
actually been installed. See Appellant's Illinois Supreme Court Brief at 17-18, Chicago Nat'l
League Ballclub, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) (hereinafter Ap-
pellant's Brief).
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The supreme court disagreed, holding that it was clear under Illinois
law that the legislature had broad discretion to determine not only what
the public interest and welfare required, but the measures needed to se-
cure such interest. 9 The court saw the legislature's amendment of sec-
tion 25 of the Environmental Protection Act as proper protection of
nearby residents' expectant interests from "intolerable" noise from night-
time sporting events. 20 The supreme court, agreeing with the circuit
court below, felt the city of Chicago's ordinance was equally a proper use
of police power to protect the public health, safety, morals, and welfare
of the people, as provided for in the Illinois Constitution.2'
The Cubs raised as an additional separation of powers argument
that the legislature and city had overstepped their authority by incor-
rectly classifying the ballclub as a public nuisance,22 and that because the
regulations applied only to Wrigley Field, what was really being accom-
plished was a legislative attempt to enjoin aprivate nuisance.23 Thus, the
question of whether the private nuisance was to be abated should have
been left to the judiciary and should not have been determined
legislatively.24
The court rejected the Cubs' argument and stated that at times a
private nuisance may interfere with public rights and can therefore be-
come a public nuisance. 25 Thus, the court held that the enactments were
within the power of the legislature and the city.
26
The Cubs next attacked the constitutionality of the regulations as
violating the state and federal Equal Protection Clauses27 and the provi-
19. Id. at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1252 (citing People v. McCarty, 86 Ill. 2d 247, 427 N.E.2d
147 (1981) (the Illinois legislature had discretion to classify cocaine as a narcotic drug) and
Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968) (the legislature revised school
bus routes to take into consideration segregation)).
20. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1248.
21. Id. at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
22. A public nuisance is defined as "an interference with the rights of the community at
large." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 88, at 572-73 (4th ed. 1971).
23. A private nuisance is a civil wrong based on a disturbance of rights in land. W. PROS-
SER, supra note 22, § 88 at 572-73.
24. Thompson, 108 Il1. 2d at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
25. Id. at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249. See PROSSER, supra note 22, § 88 at 572-73.
26. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
27. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
The Illinois Constitution states:
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sion of the Illinois Constitution prohibiting special legislation.28 The
Cubs argued that the regulations affected only Wrigley Field and not
other stadiums in the state.29 Justice Ward rejected the Cubs' argument,
because the language of the regulations did not single out Wrigley Field,
and was unambiguous on its face.a" The court added that constitution-
ally it was not required to provide uniform treatment to all persons in
legislative classifications. "The legislature need not choose between legis-
lating against all evils of the same kind or not legislating at all. Instead it
may choose to address itself to what it perceives to be the most acute
need." 3
In analyzing the classifications in the regulations challenged in this
case, the court linked the Cubs' claims for denial of equal protection and
special legislation, because it believed that these claims were both to be
judged by the same standard. 2 The court found the standard to be that
unless the legislation operates to the disadvantage of a suspect classifica-
tion or infringes upon a fundamental right, the legislation must simply
have a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest to be
constitutional.33
The declared purpose of Title VI of the state Environmental Protec-
tion Act was "to prevent noise which creates a public nuisance., 3 4 The
court found that the amendment in question furthered a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in protecting the property and other interests of resi-
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1970).
The court here defined a denial of equal protection as when arbitrary discrimi-
nation occurs against a person, which results from a withholding of a right, benefit or
privilege by the government which does not have a reasonable basis for its action.
Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1250.
28. The Illinois Constitution states: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local
law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law can be made
applicable shall be a matter of judicial determination." ILL. CONST. art IV, § 13 (1970).
The court here defined special legislation as conferring a special benefit upon a person to
the exclusion of others similarly situated. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 367, 483 N.E. 2d at 1250.
29. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
30. Id. at 366, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
31. Id. at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1250. See, e.g., Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593,
601.02, 237 N.E.2d 498, 503 (1968); Rockford Drop Forge Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 79
Ill. 2d 271, 281, 402 N.E.2d 602, 606 (1980).
32. See infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of each
classification.
33. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 368, 483 N.E.2d at 1250. See also Ill. Hous. Dev. v. Van
Meter, 82 Ill. 2d 116, 123, 412 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1980); Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh,
67 Il1. 2d 413, 422, 367 N.E.2d 1325, 1327 (1977).
34. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 1/2, para. 1025 (1983).
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dents who live near Wrigley Field,35 and further, that the classifications
within the regulation reasonably related to preventing a public nui-
sance.36 The court similarly found that the classifications within the city
ordinance were equally reasonable.3 7 The court concluded by pointing
out that the classifications do not have to be precise, accurate, or harmo-
nious as long as they accommodate the legislative purpose.3 8
ANALYSIS
The primary hurdle blocking the Cubs' case was establishing that
the state statute and the city ordinance solely applied to and were in-
tended for Wrigley Field. The Cubs' claims for violations of separation
of powers, equal protection and special legislation were all premised on
the claim that these regulations specifically applied to Wrigley.3 9
The legislative history of both the statute and the ordinance strongly
supported the Cubs' point. The Cubs presented transcripts from the de-
bate on the amendment on the floor of the state legislature.' There,
Representative Levin, co-sponsor for the amendment, said: "We repre-
sent the Wrigley Field area of Chicago. House Bill 1955 is aimed at mak-
ing it difficult for the Chicago Cubs to put lights in Wrigley Field."
'4
Co-sponsor Marovitz also stated: "We should be proud of the uni-
queness of Wrigley Field. Let's retain the uniqueness of Wrigley Field
and vote for House Bill 1955."42
Similarly, at a hearing concerning the city ordinance, a question that
was put to counsel for the Lake View Citizens' Council clearly demon-
strated the intent of the ordinance:
ALDERMAN D'AMATO: "Would this effect any other stadi-
ums other than Wrigley Field?"
MR. DIAMOND: "At this point we do not believe so. Cer-
tainly it would affect Wrigley Field or any other stadium which
attempted to relocate in the center of a residential area, but at
the moment we do not believe that this in fact would affect any
other stadium.
43
The city of Chicago also admitted in a verified answer that the ordinance
35. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 369, 483 N.E.2d at 1251.
36. Id. at 369, 483 N.E.2d at 1251.
37. Id. at 371, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
38. Id.
39. Appellant's Brief, supra note 18, at 5-9.
40. Id. at 6-11.
41. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 11.
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"was directed solely at Wrigley Field and was solely intended to ban
night baseball at Wrigley Field."'
Despite this evidence, the supreme court, relying on an earlier deci-
sion in People v. Singleton,45 stated that because the language of the regu-
lations was clear, its meaning should be given effect.46 Yet, as the Cubs
pointed out, this same supreme court had recently stated: "It is of course
fundamental that in statutory construction, a court will seek to deter-
mine the true intent of the legislature."47 Even in Singleton the court
hedged on its "clear on its face" ruling by saying: "We recognize, how-
ever, that this is not an inflexible rule; the statute may be interpreted as
permissive, depending upon the context of the provision and the intent of
the drafters.""a The court's rejection of legislative history presented by
the Cubs was not consistent with its past decisions.49
In rejecting the Cubs' argument that the regulations affected only
44. City of Chicago's Verified Answer at para. 13. (The city later attempted to recant its
admission in a pleading called "Amended Paragraphs 8 and 13 of City of Chicago's Verified
Answer" See Appellant's Brief at 9).
45. 103 Ill. 2d 339, 469 N.E.2d 200 (1984). (In Singleton, the supreme court held that the
defendant, who was convicted of a felony, had to serve his term consecutively with another
term for an earlier misdemeanor. The court refused to look beyond the language of Section 5-
8-4(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which allowed consecutive sentences to be served.
103 Ill. 2d at 344, 469 N.E.2d at 203).
46. Thompson, 108 I11. 2d at 366, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
47. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ill. 2d 63, 65, 477 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1985) (em-
phasis added). In this case, the supreme court denied a taxpayer's claim that a printing press
was exempt from use tax. The court looked to the legislative history to show that "printing
presses were not intended to be included as an exemption." 106 Ill. 2d at 65, 477 N.E.2d at
484.
48. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d at 342, 469 N.E.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
49. In Chicago Tribune, the court lists other cases where it had ruled that it was funda-
mental to determine the legislative intent. 106 Ill. 2d at 69, 477 N.E.2d at 484 (citing People v.
Beam, 74 Ill. 2d 240, 242, 384 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (1979); People v. Savaiano, 66 Ill. 2d 7, 15,
359 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1976); People v. Scott, 57 Ill. 2d 353, 358, 312 N.E.2d 596, 599 (1974).
However, in Singleton, the court relied on cases for the proposition that no further scrutiny is
necessary when the language of the statute is clear on its face. 103 II1. 2d at 342, 469 N.E.2d at
202. (citing People v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138,141, 445 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (1983); Franzese v.
Trinko, 66 I11. 2d 136, 139-40, 361 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1977)). Thus the court seems to have
chosen two roads on this issue and has given no clear indication of which one to take.
The United States Supreme Court has leaned toward relying on only the language of the
document. It has said that when the terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete except in "rare and exceptional circumstances." Rubin v. U.S., 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981). The Court has defined "rare and exceptional circumstances" as being the existence of
"something to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail."
To determine the intent of Congress the Court looks to structure and history. TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 187 n.33, (1978) (citing Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)). Applying the
Court's test to this case, the legislative history of the regulations provides strong support that
they apply solely to Wrigley Field. Thus, based on this being a rare and exceptional circum-
stance, the language of the statute might stand a good chance of not prevailing.
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Wrigley Field, the court relied on the fact that this legislation could also
apply to future stadiums in the state and city."° This ideally is true, but
considering the fact that no one has built a stadium in Chicago in fifty
years, this is not realistic."' As the Cubs attempted to point out, the
nighttime use restrictions would make it unlikely that anyone would
build a stadium today.
5 2
Putting aside the court's refusal to look beyond the language of the
statute or ordinance, the classifications themselves, upon strict analysis,
only questionably fulfill their purpose and tend to apply only to Wrigley.
The purpose of section 25 of the Environmental Protection Act was to
establish guidelines for protecting the interests of residents from night-
time noise pollution. 3 "That noise was to be limited on the basis of an
objective, quantitative standard .. .
In looking at the classifications of the statute and ordinance individ-
ually, the level of objectivity that the court apparently utilized should be
critically examined.
A. Population
The state statute classified the amendment as applying only to a city
with more than 1,000,000 people.55 This legislation would only apply to
Chicago, since it is the only city in Illinois with over 1,000,000 people.
The Illinois supreme court said a legislative classification based on popu-
lation would be sustained "where founded on a rational difference of situ-
ation or condition existing in the persons or objects upon which the
classification rests and there is a reasonable basis for the classification in
view of the objects and purposes to be accomplished." 6
In applying this standard, the court reasoned that in a densely popu-
lated area more people would be affected by a nighttime ballgame. The
court noted that the area would become overburdened with parking and
streets would be busier and more dangerous for children. Also, since
more residents would be at home at night, traffic patterns and police pa-
trols would have to be altered. An increase in crime would also be a
50. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1249-50.
51. Appellant's Brief, supra note 18, at 26-27.
52. Id. at 26.
53. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1248.
54. Id. at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249 (emphasis added).
55. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
56. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 369, 483 N.E.2d at 1251 (citing People v. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d
472, 477, 288 N.E.2d 469, 473 (1972) (quoting Dubois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill. 2d 392, 118 N.E.2d
295 (1954))).
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The inconsistency in this argument is that virtually the same
problems exists on weekends when people, for the most part, are not
working and children are not attending school. The Cubs have played
weekend games at Wrigley since 1914 and have retained a good rapport
with the neighborhood.58 Therefore it seems inconsistent to believe a ra-
tional reason existed for the classification.
B. Professional Athletes
The state statute also limited the applicability of the amendment to
baseball, football or soccer played by professional athletes.59 The justifi-
cation for this classification was that "there is a widely entertained opin-
ion that amateur athletics, which are not profit-oriented, benefit the
public."'
First of all, the statement that all amateur athletics are not profit
oriented is not correct. An argument disproving the court's analysis
would be the business of college football. Even though college athletes
are not paid, revenue that is brought in from games goes to support the
entire athletic department and other departments in the school." There
is clearly a profit motive. Additionally, professional sports also benefit
the public in more ways than one. Teams bring revenue to the city62 and
are also a source of recreation and pride.63
57. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 369, 483 N.E.2d at 1251.
58. A demographic study conducted by the city of Chicago for the Cubs released in April
1985, states that 84% of those polled agreed that the Cubs are an asset to the neighborhood.
Comm'r, Chicago Dep't of Economic Dev., Suryey Among Wrigley Field Neighborhood Resi-
dents (April 1985) [hereinafter The Study].
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
60. Thompson. 108 Ill. 2d at 370-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1251.
61. U.C.L.A. football and basketball, based on ticket and television revenue, primarily
support the other 21 men's and women's sports. As an example, U.C.L.A., by going to the
N.C.A.A. Men's Basketball Tournament, collected $400,000. This money will be used wher-
ever it is necessary in the program. Telephone interview with Michael Sondheimer, U.C.L.A.
Associate Athletic Director (March 25, 1987).
62. The Study reported that the presence of the Cubs injects $100 million annually into the
neighborhood, Chicago, and the metropolitan economy. The Study, supra note 58, at i; (intro-
ductory letter from Commissioner Robert Mier (April 25, 1986)).
63. As Circuit Court Judge Curry put it so articulately in his opinion:
"Baseball, the national pastime'-the thing of which young boys dream and old
boys fantasize-the subject of songs, poems, satire, ballads and verse-the occupa-
tion of heroes and bums-the grist for the columnist and the gambler-the avoca-
tion of the bystander and the theatre for the grandstander-the ballast for the
summer months and the leaven for the winter months-the theme which accomo-
dates both nostalgia and expectation-a game that can be played as work, witnessed
as fun and memorialized as history."
Chicago National League Ballclub, Inc. v. Thompson, No. 84CH 11384, slip. op. at 1-2.
1987]
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More important, this classification does not help achieve the pur-
pose of preventing noise pollution. Amateur night baseball or a college
football game played at Wrigley Field would cause the same difficulties
as the Cubs present to the residents of Lake View.
C. Where Nighttime Events Were Not Played Prior To July 1, 1982
The court also found it proper for the legislature to limit the scope
of the amendment to stadiums where no nighttime events were held prior
to July 1, 19 82 .' The court said it could address a problem one step at a
time. "The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a rem-
edy there, neglecting the others."65
Prior to July 1, 1982, night games had been played in Chicago at
Soldier Field, Comiskey Park, and Chicago Stadium- the only other
places in the city of Chicago where professional sports are traditionally
played.66 Thus these stadiums were exempted from the amendment.
Once again, the question of objectivity arises, as this supports the Cubs'
position that this statute applies only to Wrigley.
D. The City Ordinance
The city of Chicago's ordinance is limited to a stadium or playing
field which is not totally enclosed, contains more than 15,000 seats and is
located within 500 feet of 100 or more dwelling units.67 The court, ap-
pearing to acknowledge the shortcomings of the classifications, neverthe-
less supported the numbers by saying that "the classifications are not
required to be precise, accurate or harmonious, so long as they accom-
plish the legislative purpose."68
One is left to wonder, however, that if the city is objectively trying to
curb nighttime noise pollution, why make the numbers so specific? Co-
miskey Park, home of baseball's Chicago White Sox, was exempt from
the amendment even though nearly the same number of people reside in
a square-mile radius around the stadium as live around Wrigley Field.69
Additionally, even though an enclosed stadium may block out noise, the
problems of parking, traffic, litter and police protection would still exist.
64. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 371, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
65. Id.
66. Appellant's Brief, supra note 18, at 6.
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 372, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
69. According to a 1980 census, Comiskey Park has a population of 1,785 within a one-
square mile radius of the park, as opposed to 1,336 for Wrigley Field. Comiskey's tract is
somewhat larger. Appellant's Brief, supra note 18, at 40.
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If the court had determined that the statute and the ordinance regu-
lated only Wrigley, either through the statutory language or the legisla-
tive history, the Cubs would have had a much better chance of showing
that this case was indeed a legislative attempt to enjoin a private nui-
sance, since a private nuisance is a specific landowner's unreasonable use
of property to the disturbance of adjacent landowners.7°
A finding of a private nuisance would have supported the Cubs'
claim for a violation of the separation of powers principle, because the
remedy for a private nuisance lies in the courts, not in the legislature.71
It does seem that the court had these ramifications in mind. Although
refusing to call this issue anything but a public nuisance, the court tried
to dull the distinction between a private and public nuisance by saying
"[a] private nuisance, however, that interferes with public rights can also
constitute a public nuisance. '72 To support this statement, the court
cited Prosser's treatise: ". . .[A] public nuisance may also be a private one
when it interferes with the enjoyment of land, and that even apart from
this there are circumstances in which a private individual may have a
tort action for the public offense itself . . . ." Comparing Prosser's
words with the court's, it is questionable whether the court is correctly
citing Prosser. Prosser's point is that a public nuisance may in some
circumstances also be a private nuisance, not that private nuisances can
convert into public nuisances, per the Thompson court.
The court cited another of its decisions, Village of Wilsonville v. SCA
Services 74 to support the proposition that nuisances could be both pri-
vate and public. In Village of Wilsonville, however, the court never said
why it could be both and did not reason that a private nuisance, that
interferes with public rights, can also constitute a public nuisance.75
The refusal of the court to look beyond the language of the statute
and ordinance was equally damaging to the Cubs' claims for equal pro-
tection and violation of special legislation. As the court said, both equal
protection and special legislation require that legislation does not operate
to the disadvantage of a suspect classification or infringe upon a funda-
70. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. LaSalle Nat'l. Bank, 77 Ill. App. 3d 478, 485 (1st Dist
1979). See generally W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 87, at 619 (5th ed.
1984).
71. See generally W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 70, § 89, at 637-43.
72. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
73. Id. at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249 (citing PROSSER, supra note 22, § 88 at 572-73).
74. 86 Il. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981) (where the Illinois Supreme Court said a chemical
waste dump constituted both a private and a public nuisance).
75. Id. at 21-22, 426 N.E.2d at 834.
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mental right.7 6 In other words, when a state through legislation creates a
classification, it may not arbitrarily discriminate against one in favor of
another similarly situated. It is the duty of the court to determine
whether disparate treatment is arbitrary." In the instant case, the
supreme court would not admit that the legislation was arbitrary, in that
it regulated only Wrigley, and thus there was no potential suspect classi-
fication for the court to analyze.
The court's rejection of the special legislation and equal protection
claims was also based on the government's police power "to regulate,
restrain or prohibit that which is harmful to the public welfare even
though the regulation, restraint or prohibition might interfere with the lib-
erty or property of an individual."'7 Here too, if the court had found the
legislation to apply only to Wrigley, the court's reasoning would have
been affected. As the Cubs attempted to point out, the court itself had
stated on previous occasions that the exercise of the police power con-
cerning a claimed misuse of a specific parcel of land was not the province
of a legislative body.79
CONCLUSION
If a reader adopts the Illinois Supreme Court's view, that it merely
needed to rely on the language of the regulations, then this case is helpful
for statutory interpretation. But, it is important to note the court's arbi-
trary analysis and its failure to focus on the means used to achieve the
legislation. Knowing the true intent of the legislature and the city coun-
cil, the only rational conclusion one can reach is that justice was not
served. The Cubs and Wrigley Field were singled out by these pieces of
legislation and their claims deserved more attention.
What this decision provides is a license for the legislature and the
city to create discriminatory legislation, so long as they do not specifi-
cally refer to a chosen individual or group in the language of the statute
or ordinance. An additional question that arises in this case is what hap-
pens when a legislature regulates an expectant interest and the interest
turns out not to exist.
In April 1986, the Cubs, with the assistance of the city of Chicago's
76. See supra notes 27-28.
77. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 441 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
opinion).
78. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 368, 483 N.E.2d at 1250 (citing People v. Warren, 11 111. 2d
420, 424-25, 143 N.E.2d 28, 31 (1957); City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111, 398
N.E.2d 829 (1979)) (emphasis added).
79. Appellant's Brief, supra note 18, at 56. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville, 86 I1. 2d at 21-
22, 426 N.E.2d at 834.
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Department of Economic Development, released a demographic study of
residents that live in a one mile radius of Wrigley Field.80 Of those
polled, 78% were for some type of night game at Wrigley. 8 If the choice
was between at least some type of regular season and post-season playoff
game at night, or moving to a new stadium, the majority (72%) would
opt for night games.82 Thus, perhaps even though night games would
cause some problems for the community, the community as a whole
would be willing to live with the difficulties.
Granting, for the benefit of this casenote, the accuracy of these
figures, several points beg to be addressed. The first is whether a true
public nuisance (accepting the court's premise this is public) would exist
if lights were installed in Wrigley Field. Although it is not necessary for
an entire community to be effected by a public nuisance, the nuisance
must interfere with those who come into contact with it.83 Prosser says
this number should be a considerable number.8 4 This study changes
nothing in this case, but should leave the court with something to think
about, the next time it decides whether to allow a regulation of expectant
interests.
This study also poses the question of who the Lake View Citizens'
Council really represents. The opinions in this study raise some doubt as
to whether the Council truly represents the interests of Lake View as a
whole. Taking this point a step further, it would be interesting to know,
of the people who are against lights at Wrigley, how many are truly con-
cerned about noise pollution and are not just "day-baseball" loyalists.8 5
These questions make apparent the fact that the court's opinion does
not resolve the issue of lights at Wrigley; if anything, it raises more ques-
tions. Why didn't the Cubs conduct this study before the trial? It cer-
tainly would not have hurt their case. In fact it might have helped tilt
the argument in their favor. Finally, now that the Cubs are through in
the courts, it appears that their only option is to take this study, return to
the state legislature and city council, and attempt to have the regulations
repealed.
For the time being, however, Wrigley Field will remain an example
of baseball's past- with no lights and no night games. The Cubs, as a
80. The Study, supra note 58.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 70, § 90 at 645.
84. Id.
85. There is an organization against the installation of lights at Wrigley Field strictly for
the love of "day" baseball. They are the C.U.B.S. (Citizens United for Baseball in Sunshine).
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result, will have to reconcile if their home since 1914 will be part of their
future.
Mark F Hazelwood
